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 by Brian Milstein Submitted originally as a final paper for the course "The U.S. and the World," Fall 2003, at the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research, David Plotke and Aristide Zolberg, Instructors Cite as: Milstein, Brian. "The Crisis of External Sovereignty." Unpublished paper, New School for Social Research, New York (accessed on [DATE] at http://magictheatre.panopticweb.com/aesthetics/writings/externalsov.html). The term "crisis" in the social sciences is generally understood to refer to a moment of decisive urgency -- a point at which the time for the patient consideration of information is past, when the system of available alternatives seems exhausted, when the very identity of one's social environment is at stake. Thus, the French Revolution is commonly viewed as the crisis the brought in the Modern Age, to be followed by Napoleon's rampage across Europe, a wave of revolutionary attempts in the mid-nineteenth century, a second momentous revolution in Russia, a massive economic depression, two World Wars, and the collapse of Eastern European Communism in 1989-1992. All these events could be described as moments of crisis in Western history. In the Unites States, our most well-known period of crisis was of course the American Civil War; the years immediately following the stock market crash in 1929, the moment of nuclear brinkmanship between the United States and Soviet Union in the early 1960s, the Watergate Scandal, the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran, and the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon can also be called crises. Even the controversial presidential election of 2000 was, at least at the time, referred to as a crisis. Not everything that is identified at the time as a crisis proves to be such, although it would be counterintuitive to claim that one has come and gone without anyone's notice. At the same time, a phenomenon need not be so urgent as imminent war or economic catastrophe to be adequately identifiable as a crisis, if it demonstrably exhausts the system's possibilities to the point that a fundamental change is induced in the system itself. Jurgen Habermas (1975) construes crises to be in relation to social (as opposed to system) identity, as occurrences that threaten the participants in social interaction by overburdening the capacities of their institutions (3). One can speak of a system crisis, however, as it becomes apparent that contradictions of system integration bear responsibility for the frequent occurrence of crises at the social level (23-4). A system crisis is manifest in the occurrence of multiple crises and where crises increasingly become "crises of crisis management" (Outhwaite 1994, 66). Dialectical philosophies of history (such as those by Hegel and Marx) make use of the concept of crisis as paradigm for a world-historical movement that admits of critique; the "crisis complex" that can be used to characterize world history thus offers itself up the object-correspondence of a critical theory (Habermas 1973, 213-4). It is in the spirit of this idea of crisis that admits of critique that I refer to a "crisis of external sovereignty." My argument is that sovereignty, as the organizing principle of international relations, suffers from practical contradictions that make the states system susceptible to crises that preclude resolution in the long run without making fundamental changes in the system itself. The phenomenon that has brought these contradictions to bear on us today is the invention and proliferation of nuclear arms. Even though nuclear weapons evolved out of the imperatives of sovereignty and the logic of war and defense in the modern state system, they pose problems that cannot be resolved within sovereignty's framework, all the while threatening utter catastrophe. In the following section I will briefly examine some of the main ideas underlying the principle of sovereignty and its effect on modern society, and I will try show how the advent of nuclear weapons fits into this narrative. In section III, I review how sovereignty has been formalized in international relations theory as the rationally acting state and then show how nuclear proliferation frustrates several major assertions regarding how order is maintained in an anarchy of rational egoists. | ||
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(a) Sovereignty is generally defined as being "internal" or "external." This distinction dates back at least as far as Thomas Aquinas, who included among the duties of the sovereign the task of defending the "common weal" through the administration of justice within his borders and through the pursuit of just war beyond them. Just warfare requires, in addition to a "just cause" and a "rightful intention," the authority of a sovereign, who Aquinas singles out against private persons and officers of the Church as the sole legitimate agent of physical force (Aquinas 1947, 1359-60 [II-II, 40, 1]). About 300 years later, Jean Bodin would articulate a theory of sovereignty grounded in a voluntarist conception of right: concepts such as law and right have no meaningful force beyond the king, and the king himself is under no obligation to earthly mandates: "magistrates judge private persons; princes, magistrates; and God, princes" (Bodin 1992, 31). Although the Protestant Reformation was already under way by Bodin's time, both thinkers assumed a theological-political ontology represented by the universal acceptance of Roman Catholic doctrine and the at least nominal recognition of the Church as the final arbiter of the just. Since the Middle Ages, the defining mark of external sovereignty has been the right to go to war. As Kenneth Waltz (1986) points out, an operational definition of sovereignty requires more than the simple ability to use force, but rather "a monopoly on the legitimate use of force" (99-100). It is significant that the makeup of international agents is at the definitional level bound up with the notion of legitimacy. Even after sovereignty was officially detached from the political cosmology of a universal Christianity in the mid-seventeenth century, the very anarchy of the international system remains, at its roots, anchored in normativity; and it is precisely by way of this internal link between war and right that the former can be construed as "politics by other means." This link is articulated further in the volumes of writings that have been produced on the "rules" regarding war, often described in the concepts of jus ad bellum ("right of war") and jus in bello ("right in war"). The former refers to the justification of a state to engage in hostilities against another state, as well as to what legitimate ends, while the second refers to the measures a state can or cannot take in the course of battle to achieve those ends. One may of course argue that, in actuality, there are no guarantees for the actual practice of such rules and standards, and that right as such has no place on the battlefield. Yet the ongoing discourse on the association between right and war lends further testimony to the idea that the two notions are inextricably tied. In the modern period, the international system is generally characterized as an association of sovereign states individually answerable to no one. By the time of Kant, the international realm was conceived as a "state of nature" tantamount to a permanent "condition of war," where each state can derive its claim to rights only by way of its capacity to use force. To be sure, many accounts assert that right does not exist except by virtue of the agency of individual states, and right in the international system is coextensive with war. War and right thus stand in a circular relation to each other: states can go to war because they have the right, and states have rights by virtue of their capacity to wage war. Right in an anarchic system has a very different status than right within states or in an hierarchic system (Waltz), for whereas the latter is (in theory) legitimated by its citizens and a centralized regulation of the use of force, the former can claim neither. It based on this difference that Kant concluded that all claims to right grounded in external sovereignty could at best be considered "provisional." (b) The nation-state, however, is not simply a legitimating institution entrusted with decisions related to the use of force. It is also a very powerful framework for social integration (see Habermas 1998, 111-4). Urbanization worked in reciprocity with movements away from pre-modern kinship-grounded systems of social and economic organization to produce more broadly arrayed networks of interaction that would lay the basis for national societies (Nairn 1981; Whitmeyer 1997). This new form of social integration was organized to operate across greater distances and to marshal the resources of a much larger territory. Thus, radically broadened the possibilities for economic organization and technological development. Modernization -- the rationalization of the economic, technological, and administrative capacities of society that ground the modern state apparatus -- both facilitated and was facilitated by a pace of technological and productive advance that would begin to accelerate rapidly in the nineteenth century. The ship, the railroad, the automobile, and the airplane developed alongside the cottage industry, the factory, and the large corporation, all of which progressed in turn with the consolidation of a national labor force. The national society, harnessed by the legitimating force of the state, provided it with the material to create itself as a highly formidable corporate entity participating in the arena of inter-national relations. The state is thus more than a mere political actor; it is also the centralizing principle of a heretofore unseen productive and technological infrastructure. The effects of all these advances made within the framework of the modern state permitted similar advances in the organization of warfare and weaponry. Mass production of goods was accompanied by the mass production of arms; organization of labor was paralleled by the organization of large standing armies; development of commercial infrastructures evolved with capabilities of military logistics. The relationship between the development of industry and that of various war technologies was not one-way: many products that would integrate themselves into modern life were developed under the auspices of the military (e.g., computers). The effects of these developments, including their scope and potential for devastation, were already noticeable during the Napoleonic Wars and even more so in the American Civil War. By the time of the First World War, the nature of wars themselves were quite visibly the byproducts of the societies that waged them. For a number of reasons, the great wars of the first half of the twentieth century could only have been waged among highly industrialized societies (see Hobsbawm 1994, 44-9). (c) The development of nuclear weapons is, in a sense, the culmination of the logic of sovereignty. It requires capital resources that could only be exploited by an institution on the order and scale of the nation-state, or at least by means of the level of economic and technological rationalization attributed to it. Due to its massive destructive power, it is generally assumed at the level of international norms that only a sovereign entity would possess the legitimate authority to deploy one (It is worth noting that the development of weapons technology has always been accompanied by discourses about which items are permissible for private ownership and which items could, by their very nature, only be used legitimately by the state -- a distinction which remains contested in many countries today). In fact, the protocols of a monopoly on the legitimate use of force requires at least an internal monopoly on nuclear weapons and any other weapons of such scale that they could be used to threaten the state itself or compromise its sovereignty; mass-destructive warfare capabilities are tailored to and indissociable from sovereignty. In addition, nuclear weapons are a uniquely efficient solution to many of the problems of mass warfare. As deterrents and as guarantors of national security, they require relatively little manpower and are remarkably invisible to daily life. While many comment on the aspect of "terror" that comes with possessing these weapons and with being threatened by one's adversaries with them, the effectiveness of their deterrent capabilities requires no curtailment of the freedom of citizens to go about their business or exercise their rights (Walzer 2000, 271). They also seem to solve many the problems of managing a "war economy," as were made urgent in the Second World War, when the successful conduct of the war on both sides required the mobilization of every country's entire labor force (Hobsbawm 1994, 44-7). In short, nuclear warfare fits well into the historical narrative of the modern nation-state, both in terms of the right of the state to prepare for and engage in warfare to an indeterminate extent to ensure its survival and position in the international system and also in terms of its status as an organizing principle for a rationalized civil society. At the same time, the logic of nuclear arms poses an anomaly for this same narrative. On questions of war, the specific nature of nuclear weapons blurs the traditional distinctions between offensive and defensive warfare and also between jus ad bellum and jus in bello (cf. Jervis 1978, 186ff; Walzer 2000, 21). Policy makers and strategists debated in the late 1950s and early 1960s on the possibilities for a "limited" nuclear war, but could not resolve the grave risks of escalation; to this day, nuclear war cannot but be approached as an "all or nothing" game (Walzer 2000, 274-8). The defensive capacity of these weapons is therefore purely in its deterrent capabilities, and the actual use of such weapons can only be responded to with like retaliation -- the use of such weapons by one adversary as opposed by another cannot be distinguished by the criteria of offensive versus defensive beyond the notion of "first strike." Moreover, nuclear deterrence raises the stakes of confrontation to levels at which the decision to go to war at all is heavily bound up with the issue of how the war is to be conducted. While it is certainly possible for two nuclear powers to wage war with only conventional weapons, issues of jus ad bellum and jus in bello must now be considered simultaneously as the specter of escalation beyond an apocalyptic point of no return hangs overhead. Insofar as the primary interest of states is survival, which is the ostensible origin of any claim it might have to right in the international system, any endeavor that would risk the virtual annihilation of its military and civilian population puts its legitimate capacity to use force in a bind. The paralyzing effects of this contradiction increases with the intensity of the conflict situation; for while nuclear powers are quite capable enduring minor skirmishes with each other over small incidents, their full capabilities pose the greatest potential for crisis when it comes to major disagreements. We could forward the proposition that, as adversarial tension between nuclear powers approaches the level of mutually assured destruction, the right to go to war reaches its limit. Rationally acting states quickly realize that they are confronted with a type of warfare that can no longer be justified in terms of their right. | ||
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While recent years have seen a growing plurality of views in the field of international relations, realism continues to hold a great amount of influence on how we understand the international system. Thus, even social constructivists often concede that, while sovereignty may have attained the status of "norms" in the anarchy of the state system, the sovereignty of states vis-a-vis each other developed originally out of relations of force. According to Waltz's influential theory, the force-grounded relation of states to each other is key to understanding the structure of the international system, whose inherent logic governs the terms of cooperation among states, promotes certain policy choices over others, and maintains a general level of order and stability. Waltz and other realists and neorealists describe the world arena as a "self-help system" in which states act according to the principles of Realpolitik, in which "the state's interest provides the spring of action; the necessities of policy arise from the unregulated competition of states; calculation based on these necessities can discover the policies that best serve a state's interest; success is the ultimate test of policy, and success is defined as preserving and strengthening the state" (Waltz 1986, 115-6). The logic of states acting as "possessive individuals" (to borrow Ruggie's term) precludes rational action in pursuit of genuinely "global" interests and greatly limits the degree of cooperation among states, who coexist as strategic rivals if not actual enemies. An important distinction is maintained in international relations theory between absolute and relative gains. The former is measured by itself; the latter only in relation to the gains of other states. Thus, unemployment and literacy rates would be examples of absolute gains -- neither would improve for a state by virtue of everyone else's getting worse. Matters of security and defense, however, and by many measures a state's overall power are viewed in terms of relative gains. It is for this reason that many see relative gains as the most important issue in relations among states: "Daily life is essentially a struggle for power, where each state strives not only to be the most powerful actor in the system, but also to ensure that no other state achieves that lofty position" (Mearsheimer 1998, 334). This is a conspicuously realist conception of international politics, yet all viewpoints, including liberalists and constructivists, agree in general that the state system has until now been a highly competitive environment, particularly where issues of security are concerned. Such is the logic of the "security dilemma," a variation of the prisoners' dilemma: each state naturally wants to maximize its own security, but it is difficult or one to increase one's own security without decreasing that of others, who will then respond by increasing their own security, quite likely at one's relative expense (Jervis 1978). So long as the environment between states remains one of mutual fear and distrust, states are led even further toward more fierce competition and away from cooperation. According to Robert Jervis, it is only when the costs of war are too high that states are forced to sacrifice their egoism for a strategy of cooperation, such as mutual disarmament (Jervis 1978, 176-7). Until such a time, the logic of defense is to continually pursue strategies to maximize security by maximizing one's military capability in competition with others. The structure of the international system thus promotes arms competition indefinitely -- practically to the point of intolerability. Yet intolerability, like the notion of crisis, is a quality that this not felt directly at the level of system integration but at social integration. Systems do not evaluate the costs of war; people do. This has the consequence that the full effects of a system are often not appreciated until their contradictions are made manifest in the likely occurrence of crises. I want to dedicate the remainder of this section to forwarding three possible crisis tendencies facilitated by nuclear proliferation, and I will attempt to do so by way of critical reflection on three influential concepts in international politics: the notion of a balance of power, the security dilemma as a means of cooperation, and the characterization of states as rational actors. 1. Nuclear proliferation frustrates the balance of power. One bias of international relations theory -- one that can be found in all its schools -- is its emphasis on the activity and behavioral patterns of large states. This is of course the emphasis of balance-of-power and hegemonic stability theory, both of which pin order in the state system on the existence of one or several "great powers." The logic of the system remained sound based on a reliable correlation between various measures of power -- most significantly, between economic capacity and military capability. Therefore, while Japan does not have a large military in comparison to states such as Russia and France, its status as a great power is often rationalized on the grounds that it could develop one if it desired. Moreover, the sustainability of a balance of power tacitly assumes, based in part on this correlation, that the great players on the political field are themselves stable. The advent of nuclear weapons, however, gives new impetus to smaller states looking to increase their advantage in the international system. While expensive, to be sure, they are much easier to develop and maintain than a large and effective conventional force, and are more within the means of states with smaller economies, smaller populations, and less stable governments. Against the dominant position of countries like the United States, the acquisition of "apocalyptic power" (to borrow Michael Barletta's [2001] phrase) is appealing as a great leveler. In fact, there is in many ways little practical difference between the threat of the large nuclear power and that of a state with only a few bombs; nor need a "small" nuclear power be able to attack one of the great powers to threaten an unwieldy humanitarian crisis in a city such as Seoul, Bombay, Karachi, Tehran, or Cairo (all of which are urban areas of over 10 million people [Brinkhoff 2003]). In any case, while there is no generally accepted maximum on how many states can "participate" in balance-of-power politics for there to actually be a stable balance, the entry of a dozen or so nuclear-armed "small" states threatens to make the state system a much more heterogeneous and precarious terrain for power competition. 2. Nuclear proliferation overburdens the security dilemma. Jervis argues that two variables must be considered when evaluating the security dilemma, that is, to what extent "an increase in one state's security decreases the security of others": offense-defense balance and offense-defense differentiation (Jervis 1978, 186ff; Glaser 1997, 185-7). The idea is that if countries adopt security mechanisms that are clearly defensive and not offensive, neighboring states would cease to be threatened by them, and the dilemma would be overcome; war, on the other hand, becomes more likely if states are continuously threatened by the aggressive potential of each other's military. The extent to which this is possible depends largely on the nature of military technology -- whether the technology is such that that it is clearly defensive or offensive or can be used either way. A wall is clearly defensive; a battering ram is clearly offensive. Jervis labels nuclear weapons, or at least the kind most likely to concern us in the future (we need not go into the intricacies of submarine-launched ballistic missiles here), as both offensive and defensive. Specifically, they are deterrent weapons, i.e., offensive weapons that serve a defensive purpose (206-7). However, Jervis is arguing from within the context of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the late 1970s, when both sides agreed to accept each other's nuclear force as primary means of defense, and evaluates the various offensive and defensive merits of antiballistic missile and submarine capabilities according to a logic that in any other context (e.g., ours) would be counterintuitive. He is also assuming two large, stable countries that have already acquired large nuclear arsenals and which are the guarantors of the balance of power, and he still evaluates the situation to be supremely dangerous (212). He is not considering the effects that the process of a state's acquisition of such weapons will have on the perceived security of others, nor how nuclear rivalry will play out in other contexts. Nuclear weapons are much more likely to be threatening to non-nuclear states without retaliatory capabilities, and there is no guarantee that future rivalries will prove as stable as the Cold War, particularly in cases where hotly disputed issues remain between the involved parties (India and Pakistan over Kashmir comes to mind, as do the Koreas). Aside from these issues, "apocalyptic power" poses problems for possible cooperation. In Jervis's "Stag Hunt" model, states are more driven to cooperate as the costs of mutual noncooperation approach intolerability. Nuclear rivalry clearly fits this model, and mutual cooperation is in fact the only path that could provide real security. Jervis points out, however, that cooperation has its own problems: If the costs are high enough so that DD [mutual defection] is the last choice for both sides, the game will shift to "Chicken." This game differs from the Stag Hunt in that each actor seeks to exploit the other; it differs from Prisoner's Dilemma in that both actors share an interest in avoiding mutual noncooperation. In Chicken, if you think the other side is going to defect, you have to cooperate because, although being exploited (CD) is bad, it is not as bad as a total breakdown (DD). ...The side that can credibly threaten to disrupt the relationship unless its demands are met can exploit the other. This situation may not be stable, since the frequent use of threats may be incompatible with the maintenance of a cooperative relationship. (177-8) Agreement on nuclear deterrence policies does not make all the usual interstate disputes that have plagued states since Westphalia disappear, and nuclear parties in cooperative arrangements are each given a very high card to play; each cooperative arrangement stands under the shadow of "nuclear blackmail" of a sort. Even disarmament agreements are vulnerable to the possibility of rearmament (Schneider 1994, 228-9). While Jervis does not state this, it follows from his own logic that, the more catastrophic the costs of mutual defection, the less stable the cooperation regime that could be attained. Nuclear proliferation threatens to overburden the logic of the security dilemma to the point that it ceases to be an effective strategy for achieving security and stability. 3. Nuclear proliferation increases the influence of non-rational actors. Many realists and neorealists do not accept the conclusions of the security dilemma, but rely on the logic of the state system itself to guarantee stability. From this perspective, nuclear proliferation may actually be a blessing that introduces greater caution among actors in the international arena through mutual deterrence (Schneider 1994, 214). This position -- indeed, many of the propositions of international relations theory -- relies on a basic theoretical assumption about the rationality of state actors that nuclear proliferation is making precarious. The characterization of states as rational actors was posited as a general assumption to guide models aimed at explaining the international system in the abstract, and it has indeed proven to be highly useful to this limited extent. It has also been commonly found to be a good tool for predicting state behavior, though not always accurate; still, the rationality assumption could be maintained so long as the effects of anomalies are reasonably small. Things change when a single anomaly can result in a nuclear catastrophe. Adequately addressing the nuclear threat requires greater attention to unstable regimes and to states with less than optimal command and control or decision-making systems. In addition, nuclear capability drastically alters the influence of "non-rational" actors who may not even place survival on the top of their to-do list and who may not respond to strategies of deterrence. "Nuclear terrorism" has already become a popular hypothetical scenario for those who point to the rising importance of non-state actors in international politics. The specter of ultra-nationalists, religious extremists, martyr groups, and other ideologically motivated factions give rise to possibilities that transcend the normal economy of fear that the state system is entrusted to regulate through the rationality of its members. | ||
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My argument has been that the logic of sovereignty as the organizing principle of international politics -- which accords every state the prerogative to pursue its right through war, which allows states to organize internally into a form of economic integration that facilitates the rapid development of technology, and which drives states to compete for power and security in terms of relative gains -- finds itself in a state of contradiction in the face of nuclear proliferation. It helps to remember that at the bottom of states are people, and it is only through them that any social system, regardless of its level of analysis, maintains legitimacy. As the system itself proves to be laden with difficulties that leave it increasingly susceptible to crises, and moreover is constructed in such a way that makes it difficult to come to lasting resolutions of these crises, then it begins to lose legitimacy. It is generally assumed that the successful resolution of the problem of proliferation will require at least a dilution of some of the conventional prerogatives of sovereignty (Quester 1981, 214). The Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 requires not only that states give up part of their right to manufacture weapons and pursue national defense policies at will but also to submit to regular inspections by an international agency. To be sure, this policy is enforced inconsistently, and in any case the NPT has been criticized for placing heavier burdens on the nuclear "have-nots" than on the "haves," who have been slow to meet their obligations under Article VI of the treaty to disarm. It was recognized at the time that "the nuclear-weapon states could not ask of the non-nuclear-weapons states their eternal forbearance from the acquisition of nuclear weapons while the former maintain their position of immense power over the latter by reason of such weapons" (Firmage 1969, 733). This issue has become acute in the last decade regarding the nuclear status of both Russia and the United States. According to Barry Schneider, the U.S.-led war in Iraq in 1991, intended by the U.S. in part to deter countries from pursuing such weapons, may have had the opposite effect on many states that observed the war: "The lesson of Desert Storm is don't mess with the United States without nuclear weapons" (qtd. in Schneider 1994, 227). The matter of future trust between haves and have-nots was more optimistic among the former Soviet Republics, where not only did Ukraine (along with Belarus and Kazakhstan) voluntarily gave up its nuclear weapons, it returned them to Russia, the very state from which it originally sought to protect itself by way of them! All in all, four countries have voluntarily gone from being a nuclear weapons state to a non-nuclear weapons state, with South Africa being the only nation to build a bomb and subsequently dismantle it (A.C.A. 2001). Several other nations pursuing weapons have voluntarily stopped, and several regions have declared themselves "nuclear-free zones." Nobody has ever attempted to disarm a nuclear weapons state by force. Waltz insists that "the only remedy for a strong structural effect is structural change" (Waltz 1986, 108). This may be the only strategy that can permanently avert the potential for future nuclear crises. Some speculate that democratization would be a promising strategy to achieve the level of peace and mutual trust necessary for disarmament, but the process of democratization itself poses its own risks to meantime stability (Mansfield and Snyder, 1998). World statehood is another possibility, although probably less desirable. What is clear is that any attempt at structural change must be critically focused on the aporias of the notion of sovereignty, which, as we have seen, embodies a form of right that is inextricably linked to war -- it is this that we must strive to get beyond. | ||
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